Al-Ghadir: The Fountainhead of Shi’ism
On August 20th, Shi'a Muslims across the world commemorated Eid al-Ghadir, the day on which Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first Shi’a Imam, was openly declared by the Prophet Muhammad to be his mawla (i.e. successor in the Shi’a worldview) in front of reportedly thousands of his companions. This is an important event that has shaped the consciousness of the Shi’a community and has deeply impacted debates on leadership and authority for nearly 1,400 years in the Muslim world.
This article looks at certain aspects of how the event at Ghadir Khumm has shaped critical political, spiritual, and intellectual discussions within Islam and Shi’ism and proposes future lines of research to explore how Ghadir Khumm and leadership debates within Islam shape contemporary society and politics.
What is al-Ghadir?
Most of those passing by the geographic location of Ghadir Khumm, located in the Arabian Peninsula, would almost certainly think nothing of the pleasant, yet seemingly mundane site whose name derives from the pond or fountain of “Khumm.” But for all of its seemingly plain geographic features today, Ghadir Khumm is the location of one of the most important and foundational episodes in Islamic history, especially in the political consciousness of Shi’a Muslims.[i] In late-antique Arabia, Ghadir Khumm was a strategic locale situated between Mecca and Medina where hajj pilgrims would meet and rest before taking different routes back home. It was here that the Prophet Muhammad gave a famous speech witnessed by thousands of Muslims during his famous “farewell Hajj” (Hijjat al-Wada’) shortly before his death. Amongst other statements in the speech, the Prophet famously said: “Whoever takes me as his mawla, then Ali is his mawla.”
“Whoever takes me as his mawla, then Ali is his mawla.”
The Prophet here is referring to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin, son-in-law, and deputy of the Prophet Muhammad. The Shi’a believe Ali was the most spiritually, morally, and politically qualified heir to the prophetic message and should have led the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet, as opposed to the first three caliphs (starting with Abu Bakr) who are accepted by Sunni Muslims. Mawla is a notoriously multivalent term “with the basic meaning of ‘to be close to, to be connected with someone or something,’” and can be used to mean “trustee, helper, patron” and many other words indicating a degree of “closeness.”[ii] In the Qur’an Allah states: “Allah is the mawla of those who believe and the disbelievers have no mawla over them” (47:11). While the historical event of al-Ghadir is undisputed by mainstream Muslims throughout time, it is over the interpretation of the words of the Prophet Muhammad that Sunnis, Shi’as, Sufis, and other Muslim denominations have differences of opinion. While for many Sunnis, “mawla” is indeed a reverential and respected term that the Prophet used for Ali, for the Shi’a the event of al-Ghadir is a clear indication of the special elevated status of Ali b. Abi Talib as the true esoteric and cosmological—not just the “political” or administrative—successor to the Prophet Muhammad.
As successor to the Prophet, Ali was labelled an “Imam” and his succession marked the completion of the cycle of Prophethood and beginning of the exoteric cycle of the Imamate that is believed to continue to this day. Imam Ali was not only the inheritor of all aspects of the prophetic message save revelation, which came to an end with the Prophet Muhammad as the “Seal of the Prophets” and the final revelation expressed in the Quran,[iii] but the ultimate esoteric source of interpretation, understanding, and practice of the Quran itself. According to a multitude of cross-confessional sources, the important Qur’anic verse “O Messenger! Deliver what has been revealed to you from your Lord, for if you fail to do that, you have not fulfilled the task of His messengership” (5:67) was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad before his speech at Ghadir Khumm—indicating the importance of the issue of identifying Imam Ali as his mawla. Notably, major Sunni scholars and Qur’an commentators such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti confirm the context of the revelation of the verse (5:67) to be in regards to the Prophet’s speech at Ghadir Khumm. For the Shi’a, it is inconceivable that God—much less the Prophet Muhammad—would not designate a successor and inheritor to the prophetic message which only began exoterically with Prophet Adam but in reality reflected the divine secret and love behind creation before existence and time. The absence of doing so, as interpreted from the Qur’an, would mean for the Shi’a that all of the Prophet’s mission would otherwise have been in vain—for the mission of the entire chain of prophethood since Adam culminates in the cosmological pole of the Imamate and the initiatic and uninterrupted divine impetus to dispatch divinely guided leaders to rule over society and lead people to God.
However, it is important to note that in many Sunni sources the recorded speech of the Prophet does not necessarily contain the key passage of “For whomever I am his mawla Ali is [also] his mawla” but instead includes the message of “thaqalayn.” In this famous hadith, recorded in Sunni sources such as Sahih Muslim, the Prophet stated: “I leave you two weighty things (thaqalayn): the book of Allah (Qur’an) and the Household of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt).” This hadith is of great importance as it equivalates the revealed word of God with the progeny of the Prophet Muhammad, whom are given unique primacy by the Shi’a, and points to the two cycles of Prophethood (exoteric revelation) and the Imamate (esoteric guidance to the origin).
Why is al-Ghadir Important?
Importantly, the term “mawla” used by the Prophet at Ghadir Khumm is related to the term “wilaya” or “walaya,” which forms the very fabric and foundational ethos of Shi’a thought and doctrine. Political thought and authority in Shi’a Islam rests on this key pillar which roughly translates as “vicegerency” or “sovereignty.” This notion runs through more than a millennium of Shi’a theory and belief, starting with the succession to the Prophet Muhammad himself but applied to prophets preceding him as well. According to Shi’a belief, Islam is a universal concept not contained by time, space, or sectarian identity. Islam means “submission [to God],” thus rendering every divine prophet from Adam through Noah, Moses, and Jesus to Muhammad each a “Muslim”—and each of these Muslim prophets had a successor since God would never leave the world vacant of a sovereign representative.
Mainstream Shi’a doctrinal beliefs recognize each of these aforementioned prophets as possessors of walaya (Persian: vilayat) and sovereign representatives of God. Therefore, vicegerency and deputyship is a larger worldview of man’s place in the universe with respect to God and the trust God placed in man to care for the universe. This vicegerency is believed to be shared in a continuous line from the first prophet, Adam, all the way to Muhammad and the Imams after him. The Prophet Muhammad was therefore identifying Imam Ali as his divinely appointed successor who would carry on the holy mission of all the prophets who preceded him.[iv]
More esoteric interpretations of walaya, shared with the larger mystic cross-denominational Muslim currents represented by figures such as Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), emphasize the Divine Love and breath of the Merciful God whose sigh of love yearning to be known created the universe. This walaya is at the core of the human creation story and purpose of life: to know, worship, and love the Creator, the Originator, as both the source and return of the human spirit. Therefore, in this worldview, the walaya of Imam Ali is a divine impetus for creation itself and stands outside of how linear time and human progression is viewed in modern thought. This is why many Shi’a texts emphasize that all of the prophets whose physical material existence preceded Imam Ali, such as the Prophets Adam, Noah, Moses, and others, all knew about the rank and life of Ali and recognized and called upon his embedded divinely granted sovereignty.
Contemporary Society and Politics
The event and thought expressed at Ghadir Khumm is by no means a bygone marginal historical event but very much alive as a relevant factor in contemporary Shi’a worldviews and politics. At its core, Ghadir Khumm was about the issue of sovereignty and the role of the divinely inspired leaders to guide and administer society—the best and only successor to the Prophet Muhammad being Imam Ali and the Imams following him. This understanding produces the unique status and authority of leadership in Shi’a thought as a deeply informative confessional, social, and political institution. It was over the dispute of leadership following the death of the Prophet Muhammad that the formal Shi’a movement began—etymologically Shi’a means “follower” or “partisan” and is a shorthand for “Shi’at Ali,” i.e. the followers of Imam Ali.
Within the broader spectrum of Shi’a thought, there are serious debates over the station of the Imam, his cosmological versus mundane composition, and whether there can be legitimate political or social representation on behalf of the Hidden Imam following his major occultation. While the positions of Shi’a elites and scholars over time has varied greatly with regards to these questions, what is noteworthy is the centrality of these debates around the notion of walaya within Shi’a political thought and the degrees, if any, of the assumption of walaya or deputyship (niyabah) on behalf of the Hidden Imam. The importance of the issue of leadership as a cornerstone for Shi’a thought, institutions, and politics continues to drive much of the concerns and debates within the contemporary Shi’a world on, for example, the role and authority of the clergy, including in places such as Iraq where the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani administers a vast network of resources and exercises effective political will as part of his representative authority of the Twelfth Imam.
But perhaps the most pertinent and important example of the salience of al-Ghadir and its interpretation by a notable portion of the Shi’a is in contemporary Iran, where a more comprehensive understanding of the theory of Vilayat-i Faqih (from the same Arabic as walaya/wilaya) as argued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is the dominant political ideology and state system. As Khomeini stated in a speech commemorating the Eid of Ghadir Khumm:
Ghadir has come to let everybody know that politics is related to all; in every period there must be a government; there must be politics but just politics so that through it prayers could be performed… Ghadir is about installing a government, it is [the government of Imam Ali] that can be installed [by designation of the Prophet Muhammad], otherwise spiritual stations cannot be installed…[v] The vilayat that is mentioned in the hadith (narration) of Ghadir is in regards to governance, not in regards to a spiritual station… the issue [at Ghadir] is an issue of governance, it’s an issue of politics.[vi]
In this interpretation, as argued by many of the ruling Iranian elite and their scholarly allies, just because the current Imam is in occultation, or absent, does not mean that God’s sovereignty on earth should not be administered or that society should be bereft of a Godly representative and role model. This representative and guide is theorized to be the Vali-ye Faqih, or Guardian Jurist, who is supposed to be a knowledgeable scholar and jurist acting on behalf of the Hidden Imam to administer society.
The debate within the Shi’a world is not about the legitimacy of vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurist) but rather an issue of scope and degree. In fact, a unanimity of the major Grand Ayatollahs in the Shi’a world (whether inside Iran or not) believe in vilayat-i faqih but vary in degree or scope of authority of the faqih (jurist). In other words, it is not just an issue of the position and authority of the Supreme Leader of Iran that falls within debates of vilayet-i faqih but rather the larger role of clerical authorities themselves whether or not they are involved in formal modern state politics, in that the Grand Ayatollahs (maraji’) collect religious taxes, lead Friday prayers, or exercise political functions in some capacity due to their deputyship of the Hidden Imam and the concept of vicegerency and administering or overseeing social order.
"The debate within the Shi’a world is not about the legitimacy of vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurist) but rather an issue of scope and degree. In fact, a unanimity of the major Grand Ayatollahs in the Shi’a world (whether inside Iran or not) believe in vilayat-i faqih but vary in degree or scope of authority of the faqih (jurist)."
In addition to disagreements regarding the extent and scope of the representation of the Imam, there are also disagreements regarding the nature of walaya and its cosmological significance. As some scholars such as Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi argue, the debate also relates to linguistic treatment of walaya itself. Accordingly, walaya (with an “A”) refers to the full spectrum of cosmological and divine sovereignty which the Imams possessed according to many Shi’a, as opposed to a more limited understanding of wilaya (with an “I”) in which the mundane and non-mystical or non-cosmological nature of wilaya is emphasized.[vii] On one end of the spectrum, walaya and sovereignty is considered by certain scholars to be exclusive only to the Imam of the Age—who now is Muhammad b. al-Hassan, the descendent of Ali b. Abi Talib, and if he is to be represented, his agents are only afforded mundane delimited sovereignty.
However, on the other end of the spectrum among those who believe in a more comprehensive role for the guardianship of the jurist, many reject the notion of a differentiation between wilaya and walaya. Except in the unapproachable rank of the Prophet and Imams, this conception of the Guardian Jurist in form and function administers society with the same prerogative of the Imam. This interpretation, while not exclusive to the supporters of Iran’s current religio-political system, nonetheless forms a fundamental basis to the establishment of the modern theocratic state in Iran under the leadership of a vicegerent of God. As is often written across the podiums behind which Iran’s Friday prayer leaders address their constituencies each week: “the vicegerency (vilayat) of the Guardian-Jurist is the same vicegerency of the Prophet Muhammad.” It is important to note here that in Persian the distinction between wilaya and walaya collapses since only one pronunciation (vilayat) exists in the language, thus making differentiation between the two concepts difficult to establish.
Conclusion
Walaya, wilaya and the notion of vicegerency and deputyship is a larger worldview of man’s place in the universe with respect to God and the trust God placed in man to care for the universe. The epitome and highest archetype of such vicegerency is Imam Ali, the Perfect Man, according to predominant Shi’a thought. The exoteric proof and pronouncement of this status and role was revealed by the Prophet in his speech at Ghadir Khumm designating Ali as his mawla and successor. This understanding structures much of Shi’a theological, philosophical, and mystical thought to this day, and is of critical importance to issues of leadership—whether clerical or mystical—impacting the organization of clerical institutions, Sufi orders, and even modern political systems in crucial geopolitical locations of the world such as Iran, Iraq, and beyond.
Understanding the different strands, historical evolution, and contemporary conceptions of vicegerency within Shi’ism is of growing importance as the political prominence of Shi’ism grows daily across the Middle East in places such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Central to the politics of Shi’ism is of course the issue of vicegerency; yet, in mainstream discourse the term Vilayat-i Faqih or “Guardianship of the Jurist” is treated as a contested political term, often treated in polemical language, referring to the Iranian system of governance established under Ayatollah Khomeini rather than the larger theological and philosophical concept it indicates. Future research can greater delineate the different scope and extent of theories of walaya/wilaya to determine the areas in which there is more overlap and consensus or differences of opinion amongst the Shi’a scholarly community and political elite.
Future research can also examine how the debates of the scope of such authority compares across the modern and pre-modern time periods, as the construction of the Islamic Republic of Iran itself is a modern example and application of the concept of vicegerency historically embedded within Shi’ism. Finally, another track of research can focus on walaya across different Shi’a denominations and explore how the concept of walaya has impacted ideas on authority and leadership in Isma’ili, Alawi, and Zaydi communities among others. Such comparative work can shed light on similarities and differences that can further push knowledge ahead in the field.
Read the Spanish translation of the article.
Mohammad Sagha is an Associate with the Project on Shi’ism and Global Affairs at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and a PhD candidate in Islamic History and Civilization at the University of Chicago. He is also a Director of the Shi'i Studies Group at the University of Chicago and facilitates the university’s annual Shi’i Studies Symposium. Previously he was an Iran Project Associate and the Iran Project Coordinator at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is additionally an editor for SHARIAsource at the Islamic Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law School. View Mohammad Sagha's full profile on the Project on Shi’ism and Global Affairs website. Follow him @mosagha.
Captions
Figure 1. Islamic minitaure art depicting the investiture of the Prophet Muhammad to Imam Ali at Ghadir Khumm.
Figure 2. Banner declaring the walaya of Imam Ali at the Holy Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, Iraq.
Endnotes
[i] While the internal spectrum of Shi’ism is quite vast and includes various strands of Isma’ilis, Nusayri-Alawis, Zaydis, and others, this article focuses on Twelver Shi’ism—the contemporary mainstream majority in the Islamic world.
[ii] Encyclopedia of Islam II, “Mawlā.”
[iii] The title of “Seal of the Prophets,” (Khatim al-Nabiyyin) is found in the Qur’an as a reference to the Prophet Muhammad (33:40) and has been generally interpreted by commentators to mean the Prophet Muhammad was the last of the Prophets to deliver a scriptural text (the Qur’an).
[iv] Ali married the Prophet’s daughter Fatima and a line of eleven descendants resulting from this marriage are considered by the Twelver Shi’a as the rightful leaders and heirs to the Prophet. The eleventh descendant of Ali and twelfth descendant of the Prophet, Muhammad ibn al-Hassan, went into occultation in the year 874 CE/260 H and the Shi’a await his return, alongside Jesus, at end-times to establish a just government and ideal society.
[v] Khomeini is referring here to larger debates within Islam regarding the term “mawla” and whether the Prophet meant the term and his address at Ghadir Khumm to designate Ali as his successor to be followed and obeyed, or whether the Prophet only meant to identify Ali’s lofty spiritual status to the Muslim community without any explicit political connotation.
[vi] Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifih-ye Imam, (Tehran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works), v. 20, pg. 109-111.
[vii] Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, The Spirituality of Shi’i Islam (New York: IB Tauris, 2011), 231.